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Abstract
i
ABSTRACT
Sophisticated estate planning encompasses the concept of valuation discounting.
Discounting can be accomplished by transferring fractional parts of a property interest, or
arranging things so that only a fractional part is owned at death.  A minority discount
and/or marketability discount is claimed for the fractional interest.  The IRS has
unsuccessfully challenged fractionalization using an "aggregation theory" under which
interests of family members in the property are combined into a majority interest,
precluding a minority discount.  In two 1999 Tax Court cases, the IRS also lost when it
attempted to expand its "aggregation theory" to include stock held in a so-called "QTIP"
trust.  This paper examines these cases and also explores other estate tax issues.
Introduction
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the cutting edge of estate planning has been the promotion of
stratagems to transfer property (e.g., marketable securities, real estate, a closely held
business) at a reduced valuation and, consequently, a reduced gift and/or estate tax
burden.  In general, the procedure used to realize this goal is to transfer fractional parts of
the property and/or to die owning only a fractional part.  In some planning situations, a
family limited partnership ("FLP") or, more currently, a family limited liability company
("FLLC") is formed to facilitate the transfer of fractional parts.1  When utilizing a FLP,
typically, property will be transferred, usually by a parent or parents, in exchange for a
small general partnership interest and larger limited partnership interests.  When utilizing
a FLLC, property is transferred for membership interests.  Limited partnership interests in
the FLP, or membership interests in the FLLC, are then gifted, perhaps over time, to
family members or trusts for their benefit.2  Th  partnership or membership interests
being gifted are valued independently of one another utilizing various discount valuation
theories that have been advanced over the years.  The basic concept is that, due to
discounts, the sum of the value of the separate interests being transferred is less than the
value of the entity as a whole (or the property held by such entity).  The discount theories
that have gained credibility are: lack of marketability, lack of control (minority interest),
blockage (the inherent difficulty in selling large blocks of stock in one fell swoop),
transferability restrictions, discount for dependence of the business on a key person and,
recently, a discount for built-in capital gains tax.3  Moreover, the mere exchange of assets
for partnership or membership interests arguably results in a reduction in value (i.e., the
interests received are worth less than the transferred property), where restrictions are
placed on the assignment of the interests.  The concept that an assignee interest should be
discounted will be considered later in this article.
In addition to valuation discounts that may be applicable in a gift situation, it is
important to be aware that valuation discounting may be relevant where the property
interest being valued is included in a person's gross estate.  For instance, it would be
appropriate to apply a minority discount (and perhaps an additional marketability
discount) to a minority interest owned at death, even where the deceased had given away
the majority interest during his/her lifetime.  Furthermore, as two new Tax Court cases
discussed hereafter will illustrate, despite the fact that a controlling interest winds up
being included in a person's gross estate, fractionalization and thus discounting of the
overall interest is not precluded.  As one of the new cases also illustrates, additional
discounting may be appropriate at death where property interests have been converted
into interests in a FLP or FLLC.
Although the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has challenged discounting,
overall the IRS has fared rather badly in the courts.  As a result, the IRS seems to have
accepted the concept of valuation discounting, albeit reluctantly, at least for the time
being.4  Accordingly, when an estate or gift tax return is audited, the taxpayer is fairly
well assured that some type of discount(s) will be allowed for fractional interests that
have been transferred or that are held at death; it will be just a matter of negotiating the
appropriate discount percentage to apply.  If a settlement cannot be reached and the
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matter is litigated, it seems that the courts have a tendency to cut the baby in half or close
thereto, frequently coming up with a valuation somewhere between the valuation
proposed by the taxpayer's expert and that proposed by the IRS's expert.  The writer of
this article has heard that a shortage of trained IRS personnel in the estate and gift tax
area, because of budget cutbacks and turnover, and litigators adequately versed in the
arcane estate and gift tax area, are the reasons for the IRS’s willingness to often
compromise estate and gift tax cases involving discounts.  Moreover, remedial legislation
presently does not seem to be in the cards especially since there is a significant
Congressional block advocating the complete repeal of the estate and gift tax laws.
Accordingly, reducing estate and gift tax values through discounting in general, and in
particular utilizing FLPs and FLLCs, seems to be an estate planning technique — the IRS
might argue a scheme — that is alive and doing quite well.
While the IRS seems to have warily accepted the concept of discounting for the
time being, it has from time to time attempted to limit its applicability by claiming that
separate interests should be aggr gated in determining value.  It seems pretty clear now,
however, that in determining the appropriate discounts, family attribution will not be
considered.  After losing numerous court battles, the IRS seems to have conceded that
family attribution, although applicable in many areas of the income tax laws,5 is not
relevant in the estate and gift tax area.6  The IRS, however, seems to have left open the
door on family attribution by way of a swing-vote theory.  For example, if the owner of
100 percent of the stock of a corporation gives away 30 percent to each of his three
children, it could be argued that each 30 percent minority interest enhances the otherwise
discounted value of  the other 30 percent minority interests because any sibling could join
forces with another to control the corporation.7  In other words, the discount for each
minority interest arguably should be reduced — but not eliminated — because each
minority interest is a swing vote.
Despite conceding the family attribution issue, the IRS apparently has not given
up on the aggregation theory, as two recent Tax Court decisions filed in 1999
demonstrate:  Estate of Mellinger8 and Estate of Nowell.9
ESTATE OF MELLINGER
Factual Background
Harriet R. Mellinger (the "deceased") died testate on April 18, 1993 (the
"valuation date").  She was the widow of Frederick N. Mellinger, the founder of
Frederick's of Hollywood ("FOH"), a primarily California chain of specialty stores selling
women's lingerie.  FOH was established in 1946 and had a reputation of being "slightly
naughty," but not offensive.  In later years its lines became more conventional.  At the
time of the death of the deceased, FOH operated 206 stores in 39 states and conducted a
mail order business through a subsidiary in all 50 states.  Prior to Mr. Mellinger's death,
the decedent and he were husband and wife and owned, as community property,
4,921,160 shares of FOH.  Such shares were held in a revocable inter vivos family trust
managed by institutional trustees.
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Upon Mr. Mellinger's death, and pursuant to the terms of the family trust, one ha f
of the stock was transmitted to an irrevocable marital trust for the benefit of the deceased
during her lifetime.  This trust met the qualifications for a Qualified Terminable Interest
Property ("QTIP") trust, the necessary election to treat it as such was made by the
institutional co-trustees, and a marital deduction was claimed.10  The institutional trustees
remained co-trustees of the QTIP trust.  The terms of the QTIP trust provided for the
decedent to receive a qualified income interest for life.11  Upon Mrs. Mellinger’s death,
certain periodic and lump sum payments were to be made to the adult children of Mr.
Mellinger and the deceased until age 65, certain periodic and lump sum payments were to
be made to their grandchildren until age 30, and thereafter the balance in the trust was to
be distributed to certain tax exempt charitable organizations.  On the date of death of the
deceased, the QTIP trust held 2,460,580 shares of FOH, which was 27.8671 percent of its
issued and outstanding stock.
After Mr. Mellinger's death, the deceased removed her one-half community share
of the FOH stock from the family trust (i.e., 2,460,580 shares) and transferred it to a
revocable trust she had established (the "Harriet Trust").  Consequently, this trust, with
the same institutional co-trustees, also held 27.8671 percent of the issued and outstanding
stock of FOH.  Under the terms of this trust, upon the death of the decedent, the co-
trustees were to sell the decedent's residence and distribute the proceeds to her children.
The balance of the assets were to be held by the trust and periodic distributions were to
be made to her children and certain grandchildren.  Upon the death of the children and
grandchildren, the ultimate beneficiaries were certain charitable organizations.
The FOH stock held in both the QTIP trust and the Harriet Trust was included in
the deceased's gross estate12 and was valued at $4.79 per share.  At the valuation date, the
deceased also owned 50 shares of FOH outright.   The institutional co-trustees hired two
separate appraisal firms to value the stock and each firm valued the shares as separate
27.8671 percent interests in FOH.  Both appraisers concluded that because of the size of
each 27.8671 percent block relative to the trading volume of the stock, neither block
could be sold in the public market without incurring a blockage discount.  One appraiser
felt the blockage discount was 30 percent and valued the stock at $4.85 per share,
whereas the other appraiser felt a 31 percent blockage discount was appropriate and
valued the stock at $4.79 per share.  The latter value was used for the estate tax return.
At the valuation date, FOH had one class of stock outstanding (unregistered) that
traded on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") at an average price of $6.9375 per
share.
In October 1993, roughly six months after the death of the deceased, there was a
recapitalization of FOH.  The effect of the recapitalization was to convert each three
existing shares of FOH stock into one share of Common A (fully voting) and two shares
of Common B (non-voting except as to limited issues).  Further, the trusts were
prohibited from selling the FOH stock for less than $7.00 per share.  In order to pay
estate taxes, however, some of the FOH stock was sold in January of 1994.  Pursuant to a
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stock purchase plan, 357,143 Class A shares were sold by the Harriet Trust to an
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”) established by FOH at $4.20 per share.  This
was a 30 percent discount from the price of the stock on the NYSE.  The ESOP relied on
an appraiser for establishing the discount.  In February of 1994, 29,500 Class B shares
were sold on the NYSE at $4.875 per share.
After negotiations spanning over a year, all of the stock of both trusts was sold in
September of 1997, pursuant to a tender offer, at a price of $6.90 per share.  Stock held
by other shareholders was also acquired at a price of $7.75 per share.
IRS Position
Upon an audit of the estate tax return of the deceased, the IRS determined that the
stock held by the QTIP trust and the Harriet Trust should be aggregated in determining
the overall value of the stock.  In other words, the IRS asserted that the two blocks of
stock together constituted over 55 percent of the issued and outstanding stock of the
corporation, which was a controlling interest, and as such should be valued at a premium.
Consequently, the IRS argued that the value for estate tax purposes was $8.46 per share,
and it determined a deficiency of $10,574,983.
Tax Court's Holding
The Tax Court disagreed with the IRS position that the stock held by the two
trusts should be aggregated, and thereby valued at a premium as a majority interest.  The
Tax Court, however, did not blindly accept the 30-31 percent discount advocated by the
taxpayer’s experts.  It concluded that the FOH shares included in the deceased’s gross
estate should reflect a discount of 25 percent for lack of marketability, thus valuing the
stock in FOH at $5.2031 per share.
Tax Court’s Analysis: The Issue of Aggregation
In general, the value of a decedent's gross estate is determined by including
property owned and property over which the decedent had certain control.13  Ow ership
includes property that is beneficially owned14 as well as property which the decedent
owned, at time of death, a general power of appointment.15  Also included in the estate of
a decedent is the value of property in which the decedent had a qualifying income interest
for life and for which  the decedent's predeceased spouse’s estate took a marital deduction
under the QTIP provisions.16  Consequently, property that is, so to speak, QTIP’d winds
up being taxed in the estate of the surviving spouse, to the extent such property is not
consumed during the lifetime of the survivor.  Property included in the gross estate is
included at its fair market value on the date of the decedent’s death.  In this context, fair
market value is “the price that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, both persons
having reasonable knowledge of all of the relevant facts and neither party being under a
compulsion to buy or sell."17  The willing buyer or seller are hypothetical persons whose
characteristics are not necessarily the same as the actual persons involved.18
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Despite IRS challenges, for some time now, courts have allowed discounts to
reflect lack of marketability and/or lack of control (minority interest) for fractional
property interests gifted, or held at death, even where in the aggregate family members
held overall control.19  The essence of the IRS argument that interests held by family
members should be aggregated in determining values was founded on the theory that
family cooperation would negate the fact that each interest held by family members was a
minority interest, and that all of the interests, if sold, would be sold together.  After losing
numerous cases involving the family attribution issue, notably Estate of Bright,20 a 1981
decision of the Fifth Circuit, and Propstra,21 a 1982 decision of the Ninth Circuit, the IRS
ultimately conceded that for both estate and gift tax purposes it would not contest
discounts solely because an entity is controlled by members of a family.22
In Propstra, the decedent and his wife had owned real estate as community
property.  State law provided that death of a spouse dissolved the community, that upon
death the community is divided equally, that each spouse can exercise testamentary
disposition over his or her half, and that as a consequence only the decedent's half is
included in his or her gross estate.   Nevertheless, the IRS argued that the decedent’s
interest in the property should be valued together with the interest of his surviving spouse
on the theory that the interest held by the estate would most likely be sold together with
the interest of the survivor so that “the market value of the whole would be realized.”23
However, the executor valued the decedent’s share at a 15 percent discount.  The Ninth
Circuit, held that there was no Congressional intent to have “unity of ownership”
principles apply in valuing property for estate tax purposes, thus allowing the 15 percent
discount.24  The Court noted that Congress explicitly made family attribution applicable
in other areas of the tax law.25  Thus it reasoned that since Congress had not enacted
explicit family attribution rules in the estate and gift tax arena, it was not up to the Court
to apply such rules.
The IRS, however, argued that the facts in Mellinger were distinguishable
because all of the property to be valued was included in the decedent’s gross estate,
whereas only the one-half community interest was includable in Prospstra. The FOH
shares in the revocable Harriet Trust were included in the gross estate of the decedent
under I.R.C. § 2033 and the FOH shares in the QTIP trust were included under I.R.C. §
2044.26  Consequently, since the decedent wound up with all of the FOH shares being
included in her estate, which amounted to over 55 percent of the issued and outstanding
stock, a clear majority interest, the IRS argued that the “shares should be valued at a
premium rather than at a discount.”27
The Tax Court then went on to analyze I.R.C. § 2044, which requires property in
a QTIP trust to be included in the estate of the surviving spouse.  The section was added
to the Internal Revenue Code, together with I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7), in 1982.28  The sections
operate in tandem.  The Congressional intent was to allow a marital deduction for
property passing from the first spouse to die to the surviving spouse despite the fact that
the property passing to the survivor was a terminal interest – i.e., the survivor's interest in
the property ended upon his or her death and it passed to whomever was designated to
receive the remainder interest by the first spouse to die.29  The qui  pro quo of allowing a
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marital deduction for this type of terminal interest is the requirement that the property in
the QTIP trust be included in the gross estate of the surviving spouse, and that inclusion
would be at the property value determined at the date of death of the survivor, or six
months thereafter if the alternate valuation date were elected.30  Thus, th  estate tax on
the property placed in the QTIP trust, plus any growth in value, less what has been
consumed during the lifetime of the surviving spouse, is deferred until the death of the
survivor.
Importantly, the Tax Court observed that although I.R.C. § 2044 requires QTIP
property to be included in the estate of the survivor, "at no time did the decedent possess,
control or have any power of disposition over the FOH shares in the QTIP trust.”31
Consequently, although the QTIP property had to be included in the deceased’s gross
estate, she was not actually the owner of the property at her death.  "Neither section 2044
nor the legislative history indicates that decedent should be treated as the owner of QTIP
property . . . ."32  "Section 2044 was designed to prevent QTIP property from escaping
taxation by including it in the estate of the second spouse to die.  There is, however, no
indication that section 2044 mandated identical tax consequences as an outright transfer
to the surviving spouse."33
  The Tax Court also referred to Estate of Bonner,34 a 1996 decision of the Fifth
Circuit, which came to the same conclusion on similar facts.  Estate of Bonner had
followed the earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit in Estate of Bright, noted above.  In
Bonner, the Ninth Circuit opined that a “decedent should be required to pay taxes on
those assets whose disposition that decedent directs and controls, in spite of the labyrinth
of federal tax fictions.”35
As a final argument, which seems to have been a last gasp by the IRS, it asserted
that I.R.C. §2044 is a valuation section, rather than an inclusion section, comparing it to
I.R.C. § 2040.  This latter section mandates that the value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property held jointly with right of survivorship upon the death of the first
joint tenant to die except for the proportionate value of the property corresponding to the
proportionate contribution, if any, to its acquisition by the survivor.36  Th s, despite the
fractional interest owned by the deceased, the full value of the property is included in his
or her gross estate, excluding only an amount proportionate to what the survivor
contributed, if anything.37  The court made short shrift of this contention, simply noting
that I.R.C. § 2040 is applicable only to joint tenancy property, and that I.R.C. § 2044
contains no such directive.  Since both sections were enacted as part of the same tax act,
the court inferred there was no Congressional intention to apply a special valuation rule
for property included in the estate of a decedent under I.R.C. § 2044.38
Tax Court Analysis: the Issue of Valuation
Valuation has always been problematical for the courts: "[V]al ation is
necessarily an approximation of judgement rather than mathematics."39  Although the
regulations under the Internal Revenue Code and court decisions provide broad
guidance, valuation is a question of fact requiring the weighing of all relevant evidence in
Estate of Mellinger
7
each particular situation.40  The fair market value of stock listed on an exchange is the
mean between the highest and lowest selling prices on the valuation date.41  When a
block of stock is so large, however, that it cannot be liquidated in a reasonable time
without depressing its market value, a blockage discount may be applied.42  When a
blockage discount is as erted, the burden of proving the correctness and amount of the
discount is on the taxpayer.43  The burden is one of persuasion requiring the taxpayer to
prove its claim by a preponderance of the evidence.44
When valuation is an issue, the IRS and the taxpayer must necessarily rely on
expert testimony to determine the amount of the discount.  Highly relevant is the
qualification of the experts.45  Nevertheless, the courts are not bound by an expert's
opinion if not in accord with the court's judgment.46  Where experts offer conflicting
estimates, the court can evaluate the factors used by the experts to come to its own
conclusion,47  accept one opinion entirely,48 use part of an opinion49 r determine its own
valuation based on the record.50
In Mellinger, the parties stipulated that the undiscounted fair market value of the
stock was $6.9375 per share, the price at which it was trading on the NYSE on the
valuation date.  It was also stipulated that a marketability discount was to be applied if
the court concluded, which it did, that the shares in the two trusts were not to be
aggregated.  The taxpayer was arguing for a 31 percent discount in this event, while the
IRS contended that the discount should be only 15 percent.  The intent of this article is
not to explore the minutia involved in the art of appraising stock, but to simply present
broadly the approaches that are sometimes taken.
Synthetic Put Option Analysis — When a block of stock represents several weeks
of trading volume, the seller is exposed to a greater amount of market fluctuation.  A way
to reduce such risk is to buy put option contracts giving the seller the right to sell the
shares at a fixed price over a set period of time.  This is called a synthetic analysis since
FOH had no actual public market for any options in existence on the valuation date.  One
of the taxpayer's experts ("Kimball") in Mellinger originally estimated the expense of
entering into such options for blocks of FOH stock using certain theoretical option
pricing models and came up with a 35 percent discount, or $4.50 per share.  On cross-
examination, however, he admitted certain errors and readjusted his valuation to a
discount range of 14.4 percent to 18 percent, or $5.689 to $5.9372 per share.51
Public Secondary Offering — Under this approach, Kimball reviewed various
studies analyzing the costs of a secondary offering.  Relevant in this regard were the risks
of an unsuccessful secondary offering.  Under this approach, he came up with a discount
of about 26.5 percent, or $5.10 per share.  The court criticized this analysis noting that the
expert did not compare the present case to transactions within the secondary offering
studies that have similar characteristics, such as where the stock is traded, revenues,
sales, and similar factors.  Instead he simply relied on the mean and median discounts of
each study.52  The taxpayer asserted, however, that the expert relied very little on this
approach and most heavily on the private placement analysis.53
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Private Placement Analysis — This analysis involves studies of restricted stock to
analyze the private placement market.  Kimball testified that various surveys reviewed by
him indicated that for a publicly traded company an average discount was 35 percent.
After considering other relevant factors under this approach, he concluded that in this
case a discount of 32 percent was warranted, or a value of $4.72 per share.
The taxpayer also offered the testimony of another expert ("Cotler") to establish
the appropriate discount.  He testified that his review of studies showed there was a mean
discount of 34.73 percent for lack of marketability, the discount being most sensitive to
block size — the larger the block, the larger the discount.
Operational and Market Analysis — Cotler also testified that to value the FOH
stock properly, there must be an analysis of the company's operations and markets.  In
this regard he testified that at the valuation date, in 1992, FOH was experiencing negative
financial performance.  At the time, the U.S. economy was not doing well, and
California, where most of FOH's stores were located, was in the midst of a recession.
Also, statistics showed that consumer confidence was declining.  Further, he testified that
market studies showed there was a relatively low amount of investor interest in the FOH
stock.  Because of this and FOH's recent and expected financial performance, he testified
that it would be difficult to sell a large block of the stock in the public market within a
reasonable time at a price equal to the publicly traded common.  He finally valued the
FOH stock at a 31 percent discount, or $4.79 per share.
IRS's Expert — The IRS's expert ("Fuller") testified that the proper marketability
discount was between 10 percent and 17 percent.  He asserted that there were three viable
approaches to valuation:  (i) a registered secondary offering, (ii) a private placement, or
(iii) a periodic sale subject to volume restrictions under SEC rule 144.54  He t stified that
under the first approach, the discount should be between 10 percent and 13 percent and
that under the third approach between 13 percent and 17 percent.  He ultimately
concluded, however, that the private placement analysis was the exclusive means to value
the FOH stock since this was the most likely means of disposition.  He testified that
holding period restrictions were the primary reason for the discount.  Fuller reviewed
various studies on private placement offers.  In contrast to the taxpayer's expert who
considered only private placement block sales of registered securities, he testified that he
also considered private placement block sales of restricted stock.  He noted that private
placement resulted in an average discount of 13.5 percent.  Fuller then fine tuned his
analysis by selecting companies with market capitalizations in a range similar to that of
FOH.  He ultimately concluded that the blockage discount should be 15 percent, or
$5.8969 per share.55
The Tax Court rejected the IRS's and Fuller's approach, noting t at by relying on
only one type of analysis "he rejected an entire body of restricted stock studies covering
an extensive time span."56 These other studies showed that the discount for restricted
stock compared with freely tradable stock averaged 42 percent.
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The taxpayer also asserted that comparable sales should be taken into account
referring to the sale to the ESOP nine months after the valuation date at a 30 percent
discount and the sale by the Harriet Trust 10 months after the valuation date at the market
value at which the stock was trading on the NYSE on that day, $4.875 per share.  In this
regard, the Tax Court observed that the sale to the ESOP was not a sale to an arms-length
party.  Furthermore, the sale took place after a recapitalization and neither of the parties
had presented any information as to how the recapitalization affected value.  The sale by
the Harriet Trust was also quickly disregarded since that simply reflected the
undiscounted value at that time.57  Th  Tax Court did not consider the ultimate sale in
September of 1997, apparently feeling it was too far removed from the valuation date.
Overall, however, the Tax Court was satisfied that "the respective discounts as
determined by the experts set the appropriate range from which we may determine the
marketability discount," but took a swipe at the experts observing that "each expert
excluded information that contradicted his result."58  Cotler was patted on the back, the
Court noting that he was the only one who addressed the specifics of FOH's financial
situation in detail.
The Tax Court concluded that the discount claimed by the taxpayer was
overstated while that claimed by the IRS was understated.  Based on the entire record, the
Court determined that the proper discount was 25 percent.  Since the IRS had argued for
a 15 percent discount and the taxpayer for 31 percent, the Tax Court did not quite split
the baby in half.
ESTATE OF NOWELL
Factual Background
Ethel Nowell (the "decedent") died on December 22, 1992.  The IRS determined a
deficiency of $342,688 in the estate tax due with respect to her estate.  The dec dent was
survived by Nancy Prechel ("Nancy"), David Prechel ("David") and Diane Prechel
("Diane").  Nancy was her only child from a prior marriage and Diane was her only
granddaughter.59
On April 20, 1990, the decedent's predeceased husband ("Mr. Nowell") had
established the A. L. Nowell Trust, contributing his one-half community property interest
in certain publicly traded securities and real estate and naming himself and David as co-
trustees.  Upon Mr. Nowell's death on April 26, 1990, the assets in the A. L. Nowell Trust
were distributed into three trusts:  (i) The Decedent's Trust, (ii) The Exempt QTIP Trust
and (iii) The Non-Exempt QTIP Trust.  Both the exempt and non-exempt QTIP trusts are
referred to collectively as the QTIP trusts.60  Decedent and David were the co-trustees of
each trust.
Decedent had a qualifying income interest for life in the QTIP trusts and the
remainder interests upon the decedent's death were to go to David outright and to Diane
in trust.  Mr. Nowell's executor had made the appropriate election to treat the property in
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the trusts as QTIP property and, accordingly, a marital deduction was taken for such
property.61
Prior to January 18, 1991, the decedent's assets consisted of her one-half
community property interest in the publicly traded securities and real estate.  The assets
were held in the Ethel S. Nowell Revocable Trust (the "Revocable Trust").  On this date,
the decedent and David formed the Prechel Farms Limited Partnership (the "PFLP").
The general partnership interests were held by David and the Non-Exempt QTIP Trust,
while the limited partnership interests were held by the Decedent's Trust, The Exempt
QTIP Trust, and the Revocable Trust.  The property contributed to the PFLP primarily
consisted of certain assets held by the trusts.
Also on January 18, 1991, decedent and David formed the ESN Group Limited
Partnership ("the ESNGLP").  Property was contributed to ESNGLP by the Revocable
Trust, The Decedent's Trust and The Exempt QTIP Trust.  The general partner was The
Decedent's Trust, while the Revocable Trust and The Exempt QTIP Trust were limited
partners.  Upon the decedent's death, all partnership interests in the PFLP were
distributed to David, and all partnership interests in ESNGLP were retained in the trusts
for the benefit of Diane.
As decedent's personal representative, David filed an estate tax return for the
decedent's estate.  Included were the partnership interests held by the Revocable Trust62
and the partnership interests held by the QTIP trusts.63  The partnership interests were
discounted for lack of marketability, lack of control, and other factors.  The discounts
ranged from 50 percent to 65 percent of the net asset values of the partnership interests,
specifically:
Partnership Interest Discount
 (a)  PFLP interests in The Revocable Trust 65%
 (b)  ESNGLP interests in The Revocable Trust 50%
 (c)  PFLP interests in The Non-Exempt QTIP Trust50%
 (d)  PFLP interests in The Exempt QTIP Trust 65%
 (e)  ESNGLP interests in The Exempt QTIP Trust 50%
IRS Position and Issues
The IRS determined that the partnership interests held by the Revocale Trust and
the QTIP trusts should be merged for valuation purposes.  This resulted in the
aforementioned estate tax deficiency of $342,688.  Specifically, the issues were (i)
whether the partnership interests included in the gross estate under I.R.C. § 2038 (relating
to the Revocable Trust) and the partnership interests included in the gross estate under
I.R.C § 2044 (relating to the QTIP trusts) should be aggregated for valuation purposes,
and (ii) whether the interests in the two partnerships that passed to David and Diane
should be valued as as ignee interests or as partnership interests.  If the interests were
aggregated, the IRS concluded that the estate should be taxed on 84 percent of the limited
partnership interest in the PFLP, a 99.9 percent general partnership interest in the PFLP,
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and a 100 percent limited partnership interest in the ESNGLP, rather than on separate
partnership interests owned by each of the trusts.
Tax Court's Holding
The Tax Court concluded that the partnership interests included in the gross estate
under I.R.C. §§ 2038 and 2044 should be valued separately, and that the limited
partnership interests should be valued as assignee interests.  The general partnership
interest passing to David, however, passed as a general partnership interest since he was a
general partner prior to the death of the decedent.
Tax Court's Analysis: The Issue of Aggregation
Under I.R.C. § 2038, a decedent's gross estate includes the value of any property
interest transferred by the decedent during his/her lifetime where at the decedent's death
the enjoyment of such property is subject to a power retained by the decedent to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate the transfer, unless the transfer is for full consideration.  As
previously discussed in this article, I.R.C. § 2044 requires inclusion in the estate of the
surviving spouse of the fair market value, determined at date of death of the surviving
spouse, of QTIP'd property with respect to which the predeceased spouse took a marital
deduction under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).
The first observation of the Tax Court was that it rejected the IRS's aggregation
approach in Mellinger, and it found no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case.
The Court reiterated what it said in Melli ger, namely that "at no time did decedent
possess, control, or have any power over the . . . shares in the QTIP trust,"64 and
concluded that "[t]hese principles are equally applicable to the case before us."65
Although I.R.C. § 2044(c) treats QTIP property as "property passing from the decedent,"
the Court concluded that there was nothing in the section indicating that the decedent
should be treated as the owner of the property for purposes of aggregation.  Accordingly,
the partnership interests in the Revocable Trust and the QTIP trusts were to be valued
separately.66
Tax Court Analysis: The Issue of Valuation as Partnership Interests or Assignee
Interests
Once the Tax Court determined that the partnership interests were not to be
aggregated for purposes of valuation, it then considered whether the partnership interests
should be valued as partnership interests or only as assig ee interests.
Initially, the Tax Court observed that " ' [T]he property to be valued for estate tax
purposes is that which the decedent actually transfers at his death rather than the interest
held by the decedent before death, or that held by the legatee after death.' "67
The Tax Court determined that whether the limited partnership interests were to
be valued as regular partnership interests or only as assignee interests depended upon the
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terms of the partnership agreement.  Such agreement provided, in pertinent part, that a
transferee of a limited partner was entitled only to allocations and distributions, but had
(i) no right to any information or accounting of the affairs of the partnership, (ii) no right
to inspect the books or records of the partnership, (iii) no rights of a general partner or
limited partner under state law, but (iv) was subject to the obligations of a unit holder
under other provisions of the partnership agreement.  Another provision of the
partnership agreement provided that a transferee of units could be admitted as a substitute
limited partner only if all general partners consented to such admission.  The agreement
went on to provide that a transferee of a general partnership interest could become a
general partner only if the transferee was otherwise a general partner or was approved as
a general partner by a majority of the other general partners.
The IRS argued that the partnership interests passing to David remained
partnership interests, and did not convert to mere assignee interests, since David was
admitted " 'automatically' as a general partner by virtue of his already being a partner in
both partnerships."68  It also argued that since the trusts continued to hold some of the
partnership interests after decedent's death, substituting only Diane as a beneficiary, the
interests remained partnership interests.69
Referring to the state's partnership law, the Tax Court observed that a partner
could not confer to an assignee the rights of a partner unless so provided in the
partnership agreement.  With respect to the partnership agreement at hand, the Court
concluded that the transferee of a limited partnership interest became only an assignee
and not a substitute limited partner, unless the general partners consented to admission as
a limited partner.  However, since David was already a general partner in the PFLP, the
Court found that the general partnership units in the PFLP transferred to him continued to
be partnership units.  Accordingly, the Tax Court concluded that the limited partnership
interests had to be valued as assignee interests, whereas the general partnership units in
the PFLP transferred to David had to be valued as general partnership interests.70
Although David and Diane could have been admitted as limited partners by a vote of a
majority of the general partners, the Court opined that whether this would happen was a
subjective factor that could not be considered "under the objective standard of the
hypothetical seller/buyer analysis."71  No general partnership interest passed to Diane.
Since the case was before the Tax Court on cross-motions for summary judgment,
the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and
the IRS's motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part.
The Fundamental Question
The fundamental and difficult question before the Tax Court was whether the
partnership interests could only be transferred as assignee interests due to circumstances
existing prior to the death of the deceased, or whether it became assignee interests
because of who ultimately owned the interests after death.  Arguably, a pre-distri ution
transformation of the nature of an asset should be taken into account in determining its
value, while a transformation arising after death because of who winds up owning the
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asset should not be taken into account.72  F r instance, if a father owns 100 percent of the
stock of a company, his estate should include the full value of the stock without any
minority interest discounts, despite the fact that he leaves 25 percent minority interests to
each of his four children.  In such scenario, there are no restrictions on the father's
ownership at the time of his death and the minority ownership situation results because of
the fact that four people wind up owning the stock after the father's death.73  In Nowell, as
noted, state law provided that a partner could not confer the rights of a partner to an
assignee unless the partnership agreement provided otherwise.  The partnership
agreement in question did not provided otherwise and, in fact, was consistent with state
law, except that a general partnership interest could be transferred as such to someone
who was already a general partner.  Consequently, the r strictions in the partnership
agreement on the transfer of interests existed prior to the death of the deceased.  The Tax
Court holding was thus a recognition that the restrictions on transfer were a pre-
distribution circumstance that changed the very nature of what the deceased could
transfer at death — namely, only assignee interests.
A Sophisticated Estate Plan
After the death of Mr. Nowell, the family apparently realized that the property in
the QTIP trusts, formed pursuant to her husband's inter vivos trust, would be included in
Mrs. Nowell's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2044.  The family apparently also realized that
the property in the Revocable Trust would be included in her estate under I.R.C. § 2038.
The property in the trusts consisted of marketable securities and real estate.  Accordingly,
to reduce the values, she and David formed two limited partnerships, PFLP and
ESNGLP.74  It should be noted that the partnerships were formed appr xi ately one year
before Mrs. Nowell died.  Ultimately, David was to wind up with all of the partnership
interests in PFLP and Diane was to end up with all of the partnership interests in
ESNGLP (in trust for her).  Property was then contributed by Mrs. Nowell's revocable
trust to the partnerships in exchange for partnership interests.  Other property was
transferred from the QTIP trusts to the partnerships in exchange for partnership interests.
Thus, on Mrs. Nowell's death, the QTIP trusts held only (or perhaps primarily)
partnership interests, limited and general.  Her revocable trust likewise held only (or
perhaps primarily) partnership interests, but only limited.  The partnership interests were
discounted by her estate for lack of marketability, lack of control, and other factors.  The
discounts claimed, as previously noted, ranged from 50 percent to 65 percent of the actual
net assets in stock and real estate held by the partnerships.  The IRS obviously felt the
discounts were unwarranted.  Consequently, it tried to eliminate or at least reduce the
discounts by asserting that the partnership interests held by Mrs. Nowell's revocable trust
and the partnership interests held by the QTIP trusts should be aggregated for purposes of
valuation.  If aggregated, the estate would be deemed to hold 84 percent of the limited
partnership interests in the PFLP, 100 percent of the limited partnership interests in
ESNGLP and almost 99.9 percent of the general partnership interests in the PFLP. (David
had put in $500 accounting for the .1 percent difference.)  The general partnership
interest in ESNGLP was held by The Decedent's Trust, which seems to have been a credit
shelter trust and thus not part of Mrs. Nowell's estate.  On an aggregated basis, there
apparently would be no discount for lack of control, and a reduced discount, or perhaps
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none, for lack of marketability.  The IRS's aggregation quest was, of course,
unsuccessful.
Moreover, the Tax Court held that the limited partnership interests were to be
valued as only assignee interests rather than substitute limited partnership interests due to
the fact that the restrictions on their transfer were existent prior to the death of the
deceased.  As such, their value could be discounted even lower.  The Tax Court,
however, did not determine the actual discounts.  The matter was just before the Court on
cross motions for summary judgment: on the aggregation issue and the assignee issue.
The exact discounts to be allowed will no doubt be, or have been, the subject of
negotiations between the estate and the IRS.  Of course, if no compromise has been, or
will be, reached, the matter may be back before the Tax Court.
CONCLUSION
It seems quite clear from the foregoing cases, that the Tax Court has a negative
view of the IRS's aggregation theories.  The Court has struck down this concept in the
family situation and now has done so in another respect.  In essence, the Tax Court held
in Mellinger and Nowell that, for purposes of valuation, property interests included in a
decedent's gross estate under either or both I.R.C. § 2033 or § 2038 do not have to be
aggregated with property interests included in a decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. §
2044. Whether the IRS will now surrender on its aggregation theory or fight further on
appeal remains to be seen.
With respect to valuation per se, it has been and remains a battle of the experts.
In this regard, the more highly qualified and experienced the expert, especially in
testifying in court, the more likely will be the desired outcome.  However, the work
product of the expert should be carefully scrutinized and questioned.  As the Mellinger
case instructs, if a court finds an expert's work product lacking or contradictory, it can
disregard it or accept only such parts as it deems satisfactory.  Importantly, the expert
should not rely solely on raw external statistics when valuing a company.  There should
be a thorough analysis of the particular company's operations and markets, along with the
general and local economic conditions at the time.
The concept of discounting utilizing a FLP or FLLC seems to be well-sanctioned
by the courts.  The discount for the transfer of a general partnership interest, limited
partnership interest, or membership interest will in part depend on whether the transferee
can come into the entity as a partner or member, as the case may be, or only as an
assignee of the interest.  A mere assignee interest will be valued lower than a regular
partnership or membership interest.  What interest a transferee takes will depend upon the
terms of the partnership or membership agreement and the provisions of local law.  Since
most state laws defer to the terms of an agreement, the estate or gift tax outcome will
largely depend upon how the agreement is drafted.  Consequently, the Nowell case is an
object lesson to drafts persons of what should be done to assure that what is transferred is
only an assignee interest, with a resultant lower value.
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Finally, as Nowell instructs, it is important to recognize that the assignee discount
that seems to be recognized for the transfer by gift of an interest in a FLP or FLLC seems
equally to be recognized on the transfer of such an interest at death.
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